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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1808 
_____________ 
 
STEVEN A. WICKS;  
CAROLINE WICKS;  
WILLIAM BLAIR;  
GEORGE BIDLESPACHER, 
                                       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
LYCOMING COUNTY;  
JUDGE KENNETH D. BROWN;  
JUDGE DUDLEY N. ANDERSON;  
WILLIAM J. BURD;  
KEVIN WAY;  
DANIEL MATHERS 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01084) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 8, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 5, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 2 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
This is an appeal from the District Court‟s order dismissing a federal civil rights 
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Because we find that Appellants have not 
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
dismissal of their complaint and the various other orders from which the appeal purports 
to be taken. 
I. 
Appellants Steven and Caroline Wicks (“the Wickses”), William Blair (“Blair”), 
and George Bidlespacher (“Bidlespacher”) filed suit against Appellees, a variety of local 
government officials,
1
 alleging that certain documents are missing from their civil case 
files, thereby violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  To the extent that a 
unifying theme can be gleaned from the amended complaint‟s somewhat garbled 
narrative, it seems to be that Appellees conspired to prevent Appellants from prevailing in 
their lawsuits because those lawsuits threatened certain unstated interests of Appellees.  
The Wickses‟ allegations stem from a divorce action and two other civil cases filed 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County against Stanley Wicks, Caroline 
Wicks‟ ex-husband and Steven Wicks‟ father.  The Wickses allege that certain litigation 
                                                 
1
 Appellees can be divided into two groups.  The first group, which we refer to herein as 
“the Judicial Parties,” includes the Honorable Dudley Anderson and the Honorable 
Kenneth Brown, both judges on the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, and 
Kevin Way, Lycoming County Court Administrator.  The second group, referred to herein 
as “the County Parties,” includes Daniel Mathers, Chairman of the Board of Viewers, 
William Burd, Lycoming County Prothonotary, and Lycoming County itself.  
 3 
documents went missing from their case files while those files were in the possession of 
Appellees.  They allege that Judge Anderson had a personal interest in these cases—
although they do not tell us what it was—and they assert that “Judge Anderson‟s interest 
in the missing files made the mere fact that the files were missing particularly 
suspicious.” 
Appellant Blair is engaged in litigation with his brother before Judge Anderson 
following the contentious dissolution of a family jewelry business.  Like the Wickses, 
Blair alleges that certain litigation documents, including a written order memorializing a 
bench ruling and a transcript of a hearing, have been lost.  Blair alleges that these missing 
documents “indicate the intentional purloining of his 1st Amendment rights to petition 
and enjoy equal access to the Courts on a level with his brother.”   
 Appellant Bidlespacher owns a plot of land that is the subject of an ongoing 
property dispute concerning a proposed private right of way.  Bidlespacher alleges that 
Judge Anderson appointed Daniel Mathers to the County‟s “Board of Viewers” and that 
Mathers made certain findings related to the property dispute in that capacity.  
Bidlespacher alleges that Judge Anderson “is a past if not present business partner” of 
Mathers and that this alleged conflict of interest “demotes [sic] a violation of [his] right to 
enjoy access to the Courts.”  
 In separate counts, each Appellant raises a § 1983 claim, styled as a violation of 
the First Amendment right of access to the courts, against various Lycoming County 
 4 
officials.  Bidlespacher also brings a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and all Appellants bring a separate count alleging that Lycoming County has 
maintained an “unlawful custom” of denying certain individuals of their right of access to 
courts in violation of the First Amendment.  On October 13, 2010, Magistrate Judge 
William T. Prince issued a report recommending that the amended complaint be 
dismissed in its entirety.
2
  On March 8, 2011, the District Court entered an order adopting 
Judge Prince‟s report and granting Appellees‟ motions to dismiss.  This appeal followed. 
II.
3
 
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 
1997).  In our review, we must accept as true the complaint‟s allegations and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, but we “need not credit a complaint‟s bald assertions or legal 
conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.”  Id.  
III. 
A.  The Judicial Parties 
 We start with Appellants‟ claims against the Judicial Parties, and observe that the 
doctrine of judicial immunity provides that “judges are immune from suit under section 
1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”  Gallas v. Supreme Court of 
                                                 
2
 Judge Prince‟s report also pointed out that Appellants never effected service of the 
complaint upon Mathers.  Appellants subsequently served Mathers, and he duly filed a 
motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted in a separate order. 
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Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).  Appellants, however, claim that their allegations 
fall outside the reach of this doctrine because they arise from “inherently administrative 
functions” related to the handling of their case files.  To determine whether the judicial 
immunity doctrine applies, we must establish: (1) whether the judge‟s actions were 
“judicial” in nature; and (2) whether the judge acted in the “clear absence of all 
jurisdiction over the subject matter.”  Id. at 768-69 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, 356 n.6 (1978)).  An act is judicial in nature if “it is a function normally performed 
by a judge” and if the parties “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”  Stump, 435 
U.S. at 362.  In this case, the amended complaint alleges that Judge Anderson recused 
himself from the Wickses‟ lawsuits, issued a bench order in Blair‟s suit, and appointed 
Mathers to a Board of Viewers to make certain findings in Bidlespacher‟s property 
dispute.  Undoubtedly, these are all acts “normally performed by a judge,” and the parties 
in each instance interacted with Judge Anderson “in his judicial capacity.”  And because 
there is no suggestion that Judge Anderson acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,” 
Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769, these acts are covered by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
4
 
 Additionally, we have held that “the protections of judicial immunity extend to 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
4
 The only mention of Judge Brown in the amended complaint is that some of the 
Wickses‟ files had been “traced . . . to the offices of Judge Brown.”  There is no 
allegation that Judge Brown actually did anything, however, and so there is no basis for 
liability.  That said, to the extent that Appellants seek to hold Judge Brown liable for 
being in receipt of litigation documents, judicial immunity applies, as retaining case files 
is the type of function “normally performed by a judge.”  Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. 
 6 
officials „who perform quasi-judicial functions.‟”  Id. at 772 (quoting Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)); see also Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir. 
1971) (affirming motion to dismiss based on clerk of the court‟s quasi-judicial immunity).  
Here, the only allegation concerning Way is that, as the court administrator, he transferred 
Blair‟s case to Judge Anderson.  In transferring the case, Way was simply carrying out 
part of his official duties as court administrator, and thus he is shielded from liability by 
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 
B.  The County Parties 
 The County Parties assert that the claims against them must be dismissed because 
Appellants have failed to allege that they took any actions which would give rise to 
liability under § 1983.
5
  To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff 
must prove three elements: “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, 
and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory 
action.”  Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).  As set forth 
below, however, Appellants fail to allege that any of the County Parties engaged in 
retaliatory action, and thus their claims must fail.  
First, Appellants have not alleged any retaliatory action—or for that matter, any 
                                                 
5
 Noting that Appellants‟ right of access to the courts claim was brought under “no 
particular legal theory,” the District Court construed it as a First Amendment retaliation 
claim.  Appellants do not object to this approach on appeal, and thus we also adopt the 
retaliation framework.   
 7 
other type of action—on the part of Lycoming County.  The Supreme Court‟s § 1983 
jurisprudence “require[s] a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 
1983 to identify a municipal „policy‟ or „custom‟ that caused the plaintiff‟s injury.”  Bd. 
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing  Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).  This requires a plaintiff to show 
that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the „moving force‟ behind the 
injury alleged.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  In this case, however, Appellants have failed 
to allege any action by Lycoming County, let alone “deliberate conduct” that would show 
the County to be the “moving force” behind Appellants‟ alleged injuries.6   
Appellants have similarly failed to allege any retaliatory action by Burd or 
Mathers.  As for Burd, the amended complaint states only that he had an “administrative 
duty to maintain the plaintiffs‟ files” and that certain litigation documents were lost.  The 
amended complaint provides no details about when or how the files were lost or who 
actually lost them, and it is utterly devoid of allegations that Burd took any action at all, 
retaliatory or otherwise.  Likewise, the only mention of Mathers in the amended 
complaint is that he was appointed by the court to a Board of Viewers tasked with making 
findings related to a proposed private right of way over Appellant Bidlespacher‟s 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, the amended complaint does not even list Lycoming County as a party to the 
case, and the only mention of the County is a single conclusory sentence in the very last 
paragraph of the complaint: “Lycoming County has maintained and does maintain an 
unlawful custom of denying citizens in cases of interest to certain judges and other 
persons access to the local Court system on a basis normally available to all citizens.”  
 8 
property.  Again, there is no suggestion in the complaint that Mathers engaged in any 
retaliatory action, and thus the claim against him must also fail.
7
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Standing alone, such a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” fails to 
state a claim for relief.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).   
7
 Appellant Bidlespacher also brings a substantive due process claim against Mathers 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The District Court described this claim as “patently 
frivolous,” and we agree that it is obviously without merit.  To prevail, Bidlespacher must 
establish not only that Mathers violated his constitutional rights, but that he engaged in 
conduct so extreme that it “shocks the conscience.”  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998).  The only allegation in the amended complaint concerning 
Mathers is that, in his capacity as a member of the Board of Viewers, he made certain 
findings in Bidlespacher‟s property dispute.  Suffice it to say, such an innocuous 
allegation does not rise to the level of conduct that “shocks the conscience.” 
